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COMMENT: NON-LEGAL SANCTIONS
AND STRATEGIC ALLIANCES:
THE USE OF THE MARRIAGE
CONTRACT AS A MODEL FOR
STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
Edward A. Bernsteint
The term "strategic alliance" is of relatively recent vintage but
the type of transaction that it describes has been around at least
since 1920 when Fisher Body contracted to be the exclusive manufacturer of automobile bodies for General Motors.' The literature
makes much of the GM-Fisher Body transaction as an example of
the difficulties presented by the transactions costs inherent in longterm contracts, including the cost and uncertainty of enforcement
in the courts and the inability of the parties to predict their needs
and costs in various future states of the world.2 Although, in theory, such transactions costs should be high, the use of long term
contractual arrangements between parties that contribute critical
inputs on a continuous basis to a common enterprise - that we now
call strategic alliances - has become commonplace. I suggest that
this disconnect between theory and practice results from an underappreciation of the power of non-legal sanctions and how they
work in a commercial context.
The centerpiece of most strategic alliances is usually a contract that includes promises by each party to provide critical inputs
on a continuous basis at its own expense and share revenues. The
contract also contains an expiration date and/or a provision permitting termination at the unconditional option of a party or upon the
occurrence of certain circumstances, and provisions relating to the
division or use of the assets of the enterprise after expiration or

I

Of Counsel, Greenberg Traurig, LLP. (518 672 4809) The views expressed herein are
solely those of the author and should not be attributed to the author's firm or its clients.
I The contract continued until 1926 when GM acquired Fisher in a negotiated transaction.
2 See R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (n.s.), Nov. 1937, at 386,
reprinted in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM 18 (Oliver E. Williamson & Sidney G. Winter eds.,
1991).
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termination of the contract. The transaction is similar to a partnership, except that the primary capital contribution by the parties is
their promise to provide inputs.
The contract may employ "Legal Promises," that is promises
that can be effectively enforced by a court and/or "Extra-Legal
Promises," that is promises that cannot be enforced in a court. Extra-Legal Promises often include non-verifiable but observable
conditions - that is conditions that are such that performance cannot be effectively demonstrated in court although each of the parties will know whether it has been performed. 3 This Comment
suggests that in general a contract governing a strategic alliance
should: (1) permit termination of the contract at will by any party
and (2) employ Extra Legal Promises to provide critical inputs and
Legal Promises to govern events following termination or expiration of the term.
If these suggestions seem counterintuitive, consider what is
perhaps the oldest known example of a strategic alliance, the institution of marriage, which is usually governed by a contract,
whether by application of law or a prenuptial agreement. The
typical marriage contract contains a few verifiable promises concerning inputs, or what the parties will do for each other during the
marriage, such as a promise of fidelity or a promise of financial
support during the term. However each of the parties expects a
great deal more of each other throughout the marriage as the result
of a series of express or implied Extra-Legal Promises, such as
those relating to "love, honor, and cherish," the production of children, the type of life style to be pursued, or the geographical location of the marital domicile. The term is for life but is subject to
early termination, either at will, as in many in states, or with few
restrictions. The marital contract also provides how property will
be divided if the marriage terminates, and what, if any obligations
survive termination such as the obligation to support a spouse or
child. Religious motivations aside, marriages survive so long as
each party believes it is better off if the marriage continues. Even
when a spouse might prefer not to perform a promise it may nevertheless perform it in order to obtain counter performance or to
avoid termination. This Comment suggests that this is precisely
how most strategic alliances should be and are usually structured
and seeks to explain why they are so ubiquitous despite the high
transaction costs associated with Legal Promises.

3 See Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete
Agreements and JudicialStrategies," 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 278-80 (1992).
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Brides, grooms, and businesspeople contemplating a strategic
alliance elect to leave most of the important promises to provide
critical inputs to the Extra-Legal realm because the details of how
the obligation is to be met are often indefinite and dependent upon
future developments that are difficult, if not impossible, to anticipate. As a result of this uncertainty, the value of any Legal Promise will tend to be low and its cost to the promisor will tend to be
high, whereas a structure based on the right to terminate at will
enables the parties to exchange Extra-Legal Promises to provide
critical inputs that will have substantial value and can be given at a
reasonable cost. This conclusion is based upon an analysis of the
elements that define the value of a promise to the promisee and its
4
cost to the promisor.
The value of a promise is equal to:
(a)

the benefit of performance to the promisee multiplied

by the probability that the promise will be performed,
plus
(b) what the promisee will get if the promise is not performed (the settlement value of the claim) multiplied by the
probability that the promise will not be performed,
less
(c)

Monitoring Costs.

Lawyers often have difficulty accepting the idea of employing
Extra-Legal Promises to provide critical inputs because the inputs
are the heart of the contract and legal sanctions at least provide for
4 Lawyers often resist the suggestion that the most important promises in a contract be
left to the Extra-Legal realm because of their own agency problems - they fear ex post criticism
from the client if they do not raise and fight vigorously for detailed enforceable promises. This
behavior imposes a subtle, but important cost upon the client, namely Attitudinal Negotiation
Costs. The value of a promise is in large part a function of the promisee's estimate of the probability that the promisor will perform, and the promisor's cost is partially a function of his estimate of the probability that an invalid claim of breach will be asserted by the promisee. At the
time a contract is executed, the parties base their determination of the value of a transaction on
their perceptions of the relevant probabilities. An Attitudinal Negotiation Cost is a decrease in
value or increase in cost that results from an attitudinal change that causes either party to revise
his expectation of the probability of performance or the assertion of invalid claims. These attitudinal changes often result from lawyer behavior.
Attitudinal Negotiating Costs may have an impact either during negotiations in the form
of transaction breakdown or after a contract is signed. In a Strategic Alliance the impact may be
much greater than in other transactions because, as just noted, one motivation to perform at a
high level is to induce similar behavior by the other party. If one party expects a minimal level
of performance by the other party, he may well limit the level of his own performance.
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some compensation to mitigate the damage caused by a breach,
whereas non-legal sanctions usually do not. Another reason is that
their law school education emphasizes the function of a contract as
the basis for a lawsuit and to a large extent ignores the function of
Extra-Legal Promises. In fact the value of a potential judgment for
damages (usually the settlement value of the claim) is often quite
modest (and often illusory) after taking into account enforcement
costs, uncertainty (including the probability of error), and the time
it takes to obtain a judgment. These factors also impair the in terrorem effect of legal sanctions in inducing performance. However, even without the right to sue for breach, a promise will have
substantial value if there is a high probability that it will be performed. That probability depends upon the context of the transaction as well as the terms of the contract. The value of an ExtraLegal Promise is based solely upon the probability that it will be
performed.
The cost of making a promise is equal to:
(a) The expected cost of performing the promise including
a contingency reserve to deal with unanticipated expenses
that may be incurred; and
(b) The probability that the promisee will assert an invalid
claim of breach multiplied by the anticipated cost of defending and the expected cost of losing in the case of error. I call
these costs the promisor's "Legal System Costs."
The reserve for unanticipated expenses will be significantly
lower with respect to an Extra-Legal Promise than with respect to
a Legal Promise since the former need not be performed if the
costs exceed the benefits to the promisor. If in the future, unanticipated expenses arise, the promisor may refuse to perform and
either renegotiate or terminate the contract. Neither of these actions are cost-free, but the cost will probably be lower than a contingency reserve that would have been taken into account in
evaluating the cost of a Legal Promise made at the time the
contract was executed. Moreover, since an Extra-Legal Promise
cannot be enforced in court, it will not impose Legal System Costs
on the promisee.
Since an Extra-Legal Promise will have value only to the extent that there is a probability that it will be performed, it is important for the parties to a strategic alliance to focus upon the probabilities relating to the promises they receive. A promise will be
performed until such time (a "Breach Point") as the promisor is
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unable to perform or concludes that its well-being will no longer
be served by performing. The probability that a Breach Point will
occur depends upon the benefits the promisor will lose and the
costs he will avoid if he breaches. With respect to Extra-Legal
Promises, the loss a breaching promisor will suffer depends exclusively upon non-legal sanctions. These sanctions are usually characterized as "bonds" or "hostages" - things of value to the promisor that will be lost if he does not perform. Most non-legal sanctions increase the value of a promise by deterring breach, but do
not compensate the promisee for his loss if the deterrent fails.
There are various types of non-legal sanctions. This Comment
will address the two that I think most often power Strategic Alliances:
*
The loss by the non-performing promisor of reputation
in the market in which it operates.
*
The sacrifice of a "relationship-specific prospective advantage." That is to say that the non-performing promisor
will forego any benefit he would have derived from future
transactions with the promisee.
The reputation bond cannot often be created by the contract,
but lawyers must nevertheless understand its power in order to determine the extent to which other sanctions will add value to the
promise he is receiving or, indeed, whether other sanctions are appropriate. A contract between two Japanese corporations that are
concerned about their reputation among other Japanese firms may
present such a high probability of performance that a legal sanction will not add much to the value of promises made by the parties. As the merger trend in the United States accelerates and
companies enter into multiple strategic alliances, often with competitors, the reputation bond is increasing in importance in the
United States. When this bond is operating, an attempt to negotiate detailed Legal Promises, by implying distrust, might induce
reciprocal distrust. This in effect reduces the value of the promise
given by the promisor and may contribute to transaction breakdown or a change in pricing.
An actual transaction illustrates how the reputation bond operates in the context of a strategic alliance. A client manufactured
a product for a major national retailer (the "Retailer") pursuant to a
short letter agreement executed annually that contained only ExtraLegal Promises as to probable quantity pricing, delivery schedules,
and other important matters. Although the client used counsel for
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most significant contracts, an executive explained, "We never retain counsel to work on the contract with the Retailer. They represent 40% of our production so what the Retailer wants, The Retailer gets . . . ." Despite this vulnerability, the client did not feel
threatened, concluding that Sears believed that if it exploited the
situation, other manufacturers would not be willing to invest funds
in manufacturing facilities and devote large portions of their production to meet the Retailers' needs. The client was confident that
absent dishonest behavior on its part, the Retailer would only terminate the relationship over a period of years during which the
client would have an opportunity to replace the business. Despite
the form of the transaction, both parties had the benefit of highvalue long-term promises because of a high probability of performance, and low cost because of the absence of Legal System
Costs and a reduced reserve for the unexpected.
The most ubiquitous bond securing performance of ExtraLegal Promises in contracts creating strategic alliances is the benefit of the deal itself. As with the marital contract, the value of the
deal as a bond tends to increase over time as the value of the enterprise increases and each party develops transaction specific
5
capital in the form of knowledge of each other and increased trust.
Contract structure can affect the value of the deal as a bond by increasing the loss that a breaching party will suffer as a result of his
own breach or if the contract is terminated. For instance, marital
contracts typically specify what each party will get financially if
there is a divorce. The value of the bond in the GM/Fisher
transaction was increased when GM made an investment in Fisher
that would be lost if Fisher failed, even if GM could obtain
automobile bodies elsewhere.
In a strategic alliance, as in all partnerships in which the parties contribute services, each participant as a promisor is faced
with a decision matrix with respect to Extra-Legal Promises that is
similar to the matrix presented by a prisoner's dilemma. This is
because each participant must bear the entire cost of his own performance but must share the resulting benefits with the promisee
and will, at no cost, share in the benefits resulting from performance by the other participant of its promises.6 Thus, the best result
for either participant as a promisor is to perform only to the extent
that the cost of performance is less than his share of the resulting
5 The same process operates during the term of a marriage as the parties have children,
acquire a home, and develop other types of jointly owed assets.
6 See Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947,
958-60 (1984).
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value added to the enterprise while obtaining a share of the benefits provided by full performance by the other party. However, if
both participants perform at minimum levels, they will usually
both be worse off than if they had both fully performed at anticipated levels.
The deal as a bond is self-enforcing, in the sense that a Breach
Point will not occur, so long as the cost of performing a promise is
less than that of the promisor's share of the resulting increase in
the value of the enterprise. The enforcement mechanism for the
deal as a bond, at times when it is not self-enforcing, is a right on
the part of the promisee to terminate the contract, which can be
exercisable at will or upon the occurrence of specified circumstances. An attempt to specify the circumstance permitting termination (other than non-payment) presents the same problems as an
attempt to structure a detailed Legal Promise. It is unlikely that
the circumstances under which termination would be appropriate
can be predicted reliably or would be verifiable. As a result, any
attempt to terminate would be subject to challenge in the courts
and will subject the parties to the expense, delay, and uncertainty
of litigation. During the litigation, the contract would probably
remain in effect, forfeit of the bond will be delayed, and the power
of the right of termination would thus be substantially diminished.
The right to terminate at will avoids the cost and uncertainty of
litigation and is an effective mechanism to present each party with
a continuing option to either perform or lose the deal.
The right to terminate as an enforcement mechanism has limitations in that it motivates the promisor to perform only to the extent necessary to avoid termination, and this may be a low level of
performance if the promisee is willing to settle for a lesser profit
than he would have received had the promisor performed as originally anticipated in order to avoid termination. As noted above, if
both parties adopt the strategy of performing only up to minimum
levels, they would both be worse off than if they both had fully
performed at anticipated levels. However, so long as performance
by the parties is continuous, the decision matrix is in fact a repeat
play prisoner's dilemma in which traditional negotiation strategies,
such as tit-for-tat, can be employed to induce full performance by
both parties. If, at the end of the day these strategies do not produce cooperation, the promisee can elect either to accept minimum
performance (and minimum return) or terminate the contract.
The structure of a contract governing a strategic alliance is
significantly different than the structure contemplated by the typical law school view of a contract - i.e., a promise and a potential

952

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:945

judgment for damages if it is not performed. In fact the right to
sue is probably the least important factor in inducing performance
by the parties. Instead, a complex matrix of reputation bonds, the
prospect of future performance by others, the right of termination
and related termination provisions, and various strategies aimed at
inducing cooperation in a repeat play prisoner's dilemma situation
imports value to the transaction. The structure seems at odds with
the conventional view of a contract until we recognize that a very
similar matrix has for decades imported value to one of our most
important institutions - marriage.

